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Abstract 
This study examines the attributes of organizational rules that influence rule following. Rule 
following fosters organizational effectiveness by aligning individual behaviors with 
organizational preference. While a range of theoretical explanations has been offered for rule 
following, the characteristics of rule design and implementation have received less empirical 
attention. Borrowing from the green tape theory of effective rules, this study examines the 
influence of two particular characteristics—rule formalization and rule consistency—on rule 
following. Three studies, which include two vignette experiments and a survey of two local 
government organizations, provide the data for the research. The results suggest that rule 
formalization and rule consistency independently increase rule following, with mixed evidence 
of interaction effects. The broad implication is that public managers must attend to both rule 
design and implementation to foster organizational rule following.  
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1. Introduction 
Rule following is a fundamental work task for public employees. Organizational rule following 
shapes the pursuit of the public interest and the effectiveness of bureaucratic structure (Wise, 
2004). It signifies the legitimacy of authority (DeHart- Davis, Chen, & Little, 2013), the 
effectiveness of group functioning (Tyler & Blader, 2001), and the strength of public sector 
accountability (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). Rule following also implies the effectiveness with 
which public values such as equity, transparency, and accountability are delivered (Bozeman, 
2000) and enables a host of organizational functions that cannot be achieved otherwise, including 
coordination (March & Simon, 1958; Stinchcombe, 2000), legitimacy (Weber, 1947; Rubin, 
2009; Sitkin & Bies, 1993), socialization (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; Ocasio, 
1997; Olsen, 2006) and knowledge storage and transfer (March, Shulz, & Zhou, 2000).  
While this paper construes rule-following as organizationally beneficial, such a 
conclusion assumes that organizational rules are always used to pursue social good through 
rational means. This assumption is not always warranted: consider the use of rules in Nazi 
German (Osiel 2001) and by United Nations staffers who passively observed the Rwandan 
genocide (Barnett 2002). At the mundane level of organizational functioning, rule following 
cannot be organizationally beneficial if rules are illegitimate, burdensome, or illogical (Bozeman 
and Feeney 2011). Rule following can be organizationally and societally beneficial, but this is 
not always the case. Nonetheless, many public sector rules are functional, making rule following 
a critical function within public organizations that is worthy of study (DeHart-Davis 2019). 
So why do public employees follow or break organizational rules? Scholars offer a range 
of theoretical explanations, some pertaining to organizational factors, such as performance 
pressures (Sandfort, 2000; Sekerka & Zolin, 2007; Tummers et al., 2015) or organizational 
 3 
culture (Pandey & Moynihan, 2006; Borry, 2017), while others focus on individual influences 
such as personality (Bozeman & Rainey, 1998; DeHart-Davis, 2007) or professional or gender 
socialization (Portillo & DeHart-Davis, 2009; Kaufman, 1960; Hutchinson, 1990). Still others 
draw on interactions of the individual with the organization: perceived risks and benefits 
(Battmann & Klumb, 1993), extrinsic vs. instrinsic mechanisms (Tyler & Blader, 2005), or the 
relationships between public employees and citizens (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; 
Riccucci 2004; Henderson 2013).  
 One set of factors in rule following that has received less scholarly attention include the 
attributes of organizational rules themselves. The study of rule attributes is a relatively new 
emphasis that departs from the notion of rules as monolithic forms of structure, as 
conceptualized by early organizational scholars (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968). 
Distinctive attributes distinguish organizational rules from one another, both during rule design 
and implementation processes. To illustrate, rules can be enabling or coercive depending on the 
content of the rule, the rule development process, and the circumstances under which they are 
applied (Adler & Borys, 1996). Rules can be more or less well-understood, controlling or 
logically designed (DeHart-Davis, 2009a), or democratically derived (Tummers, 2012). A focus 
on rule attributes and their role in rule following not only strengthens theoretical understanding 
of the functioning of organizational rules, but also offers practical implications that can be acted 
upon by public administrators in the pursuit of organizational effectiveness. 
 This study examines two attributes of organizational rules, rule formalization and 
consistency, with particular potential to influence rule following. Both attributes are theoretical 
dimensions of ‘green tape’, or effective organizational rules (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). Rule 
formalization, the extent to which rules are written, is expected to increase rule following by 
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focusing the attention of organizational members on rule requirements and conveying their 
legitimacy (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2013). The consistency of rule application is expected to 
increase rule following by conveying to rule followers ‘peripheral cues’, the support of ‘like 
others’ for rule requirements (Brehm & Gates, 1997). Combining the anticipated effects of 
legitimacy, attention focusing, and peripheral cues, rule formalization and consistency are also 
expected to interact to produce a higher level of rule following than is achieved by either rule 
attribute alone.  
To investigate these links, this study uses multiple methods of investigation—two 
vignette experiments and an organizational survey of two local government organizations—to 
examine the influence of rule formalization and consistency on rule following. This research 
answers the call for more multi-method research in public administration and specifically more 
emphasis on using experiments (Perry, 2012).  
 This paper begins by mapping out the theoretical relationships between rule 
formalization, consistency and rule following. The next section details the research design and 
results of the three studies. The final sections identify limitations, discuss the theoretical and 
practical significance of the results, and draw conclusions about the paper’s contributions.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
While both individual and organizational factors influence rule following (DeHart-Davis 
2017), this article examines one type of organizational influence: the characteristics of rules 
themselves. The conceptual foundation for making this argument is green tape theory, which 
argues that specific attributes of organizational rules alter the probability that a rule will be 
effective (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). Specifically, green tape theory posits that effective rules 
require technical capacity and stakeholder cooperation, i.e., effectively designed rules that 
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people are willing to follow. From this perspective, rule effectiveness is a function of rule 
design and rule following (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2013). Five rule attributes—rule 
formalization, rule logic, rule consistency, optimal control, and understood rule purposes—
are expected to strengthen rule design and increase rule rule following.  
Our inquiry represents a partial test of green tape theory, focusing on effects of two 
organizational rule attributes that are particularly relevant for our understanding of rule 
following: rule formalization and rule consistency. Rule formalization pertains to the extent to 
which organizational rules are written, while rule consistency is defined as the reliability with 
which rules are applied to individuals and groups. The formalization and consistency of 
organizational rules are defining features of bureaucratic structure, signaling both form 
(Stinchcombe, 2001) and function (Weber, 1947). We begin by hypothesizing the effects of rule 
formalization on rule following.  
 
2.1 Rule Formalization and Rule Following 
Rule formalization describes the written quality of rules (DeHart-Davis, Mohr, & Davis, 2014). 
While organizational formalization describes the extent of written policies, procedures, and 
regulations (Pugh et al., 1968), rule formalization pertains to the process and outcome of putting 
policies, procedures, and regulations in writing (DeHart-Davis, et al., 2013).  Rules vary in 
formalization on a continuum from completely written to completely unwritten (Pugh et al. 1968; 
Kieser, Beck, & Tainio 2001; March, Schulz, & Zhou 2000).2  An unwritten rule is still a rule, 
defined here as ‘requirements for specific organization behaviors under particular circumstances’ 
(DeHart-Davis, Chen, & Little 2013, p. 333), but is disseminated verbally and stored in memory. 
Examples of unwritten rules referenced in the literature include those governing overtime pay 
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(DeHart-Davis 2009b), allowable e-mail communications (Gilsdorf 1987; 1998), and promotion 
processes (Roth & Sonnert, 2011).  
Rule formalization is expected to increase rule following via two related but distinct 
processes that derive power from the written word: attention focusing and legitimacy. 
Organizational attention is the ‘distinct focus of time and effort by the firm on a particular set of 
issues, problems, opportunities, and threats…’ (Ocasio 1997, p. 188). Rule formalization is one 
means of focusing attention (Stinchcombe, 2000), enabling the organization to narrow the 
information flow that pervades individual consciousness to specific issues of concern to the 
organization. While both written and unwritten rules can focus the attention of organizational 
members (Schulz, 2003), the inscribed nature of written rules expedites the process by providing 
visible evidence of preferred organizational behaviors that is more accessible, recognizable and 
easily disseminated than the spoken delivery of unwritten rules (Levitt & March, 1988; Sutcliffe 
& McNamara, 2001).  
            Legitimacy is the second mechanism by which rule formalization is expected to influence 
rule following. Legitimacy is the perception of authority as ‘appropriate, proper, and just’ (Tyler, 
2006, p. 375). Legitimacy is furthered by a sense of neutrality and fairness (Tyler & Lind, 1992; 
Blader & Tyler, 2003), which engender a sense of obligation to cooperate and greatly increasing 
the likelihood of rule following (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Rules are one source of legitimate 
authority to public employees (DeHart-Davis, 2017) which, as other sources of authority, can be 
obeyed or disobeyed. By contrast, perceptions of legitimacy are more difficult to achieve through 
unwritten rules (DeHart-Davis, 2009a), which are communicated through speech, inherently 
attached to specific people and situations, and indicative of power relationships created by 
personal sources of authority (Gouldner, 1954). As a result, unwritten rules are more likely to 
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raise the specter of arbitrary and capricious power, failing to provide evidence of the neutrality 
and fairness that feed legitimacy perceptions and ultimately rule following (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & 
Blader, 2005; Levi, Sacks & Tyler, 2009).  
The capacity of rule formalization to focus attention and convey legitimacy leads us to 
hypothesize that: 
  
H1: Written rules will be followed at higher rates than unwritten rules.  
 
2.2 Rule Consistency and Rule Following 
Consistency of administrative action towards both internal and external stakeholders is integral 
to effective public organizations. Consistent administrative behavior renders organizational 
action predictable and coordinated in the pursuit of organizational goals (Weber, 1947; Hummel, 
2007). In the context of green tape, consistent application is expected to elicit stakeholder 
cooperation with rule requirements and ensure organization-wide implementation of managerial 
preferences (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). Beyond green tape, consistency has been associated with 
quality federal regulation (Bertelli & Whitford, 2009), optimal policy planning (Kydland & 
Prescott, 1977), and procedural justice perceptions among key stakeholders (Leventhal, 1980). In 
each of these studies, rule consistency is viewed either as an outcome or mechanism for other 
positive outcomes of formal organizational structure.  
Rule consistency is expected to increase rule following by sending signals that support 
rule following from the perspective of ‘like others’. Brehm and Gates first made this argument in 
their study of street-level bureaucratic behavior (1997). Drawing on related strands of social 
science research, the authors argued that individual organizational members interpret signals 
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from the workplace environment to understand behavioral norms (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). 
When it is unclear which behavioral options are most desirable, organizational members will 
look to peer behavior to lower the uncertainty of their options (from Festinger, 1954). Drawing 
on Cialdini’s research on persuasion (1984), Brehm and Gates argue that signals can be ‘central,’ 
which stem from direct influences such as supervisory direction and the consequences of rule 
violations, or ‘peripheral’, which require a consideration of what one has done in the past and 
what like others are doing. To illustrate, Brehm and Gates find that police officers who have 
more contact with both fellow officers and supervisors during a shift have higher rates of 
shirking, measured by independent observers as ‘goofing off’ or conducting personal business at 
work. The authors’ survey of social workers produced mixed results regarding peripheral cues: 
influential co-worker relationships increased the likelihood that paperwork would be taken home 
and rules bent, but had no effect on whether paperwork was ‘fudged’ (1997, pp. 120-6).  
Applying the concepts of peripheral cues, the extent of rule consistency is expected to 
signal managers about the acceptability of rule bending in the organization and, consequently, 
alter the likelihood that they are willing to bend the rules themselves. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Consistently applied rules will be followed at higher rates than inconsistently applied rules.  
 
2.3 Rule Formalization, Consistency and Rule Following 
Rule formalization and consistency are also expected to interact to increase rule 
following beyond that achievable by either organizational rule attribute alone. This interaction 
effect is expected based on the assumption that written organizational rules, because they more 
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explicitly convey the legitimacy of preferences for organizational behavior than unwritten rules, 
will lower the likelihood of inconsistent application across individuals and groups within 
organizations (Kieser, Beck, & Tainio, 2001). By contrast, rules that are not formalized and 
therefore unwritten leave more room for interpretation and greater opportunity for systematic 
deviation, by definition (McPhee, 2004). Put differently, the written nature of rules makes it 
more suitable for consistent application as opposed to unwritten rules. The hypothetical 
interaction between rule formalization and consistency follows the logic of organizational 
rationality, which employs structure as a means of making behavior more predictable and 
effective for achieving organizational objectives (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Kallinikos, 
1996). Accordingly we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: Rule formalization and consistency will interact to induce higher rates of rule following than 
rule formalization or rule consistency alone.  
 
3. Research Design 
Three study designs are used to test the relationship between rule formalization, 
consistency and rule following: two vignette experiments and a survey of the employees of two 
local government organizations. An advantage of employing both experiments and surveys is 
that each offsets the strengths and weaknesses of the other. Experiments randomize research 
participants into treatment and control groups, thus minimizing the likelihood of systematic 
differences between groups. Furthermore, experimental designs enable the research to identify 
cause and effect relationships. Experiments have high internal validity by imposing identical 
conditions on all research participants. Surveys are lower in internal validity, but have the 
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strength of external validity as responses are based on observations of the lived experiences of 
research participants, given sufficient sample sizes.  
In terms of sample selection, our aim was to select research subjects that both match our 
study designs and have been used previously in the field. For the first, single-factor vignette 
experiment, we used an MPA student sample. Using a student sample in the context of a vignette 
study is in line with the approach taken by, among others, Kaufmann and Feeney (2014), 
Tummers et al. (2016) and Moynihan (2013). While the random assignment of participants 
ensures that meaningful conclusions can be drawn from a student sample, student samples have 
also been challenged as being insufficiently representative of ‘real’ employees. For this reason, 
our second experiment, which has two factors (one of which is identical to the single factor from 
the first experiment), was administered to a group of public managers. Finally, our survey 
sample consists of a diverse representation of employees at two public organizations, adding to 
the generalizability of our findings. While ideally our experimental studies could have been 
repeated using different samples and more organizations could have been included in our survey 
study, we believe that our overall approach has enabled us to triangulate on settings (e.g. 
Scandura & Williams 2000). Below, we outline the specifics of the vignette experiments (Studies 
1 and 2) and the survey (Study 3).    
 
3.1 Study 1: Single-Factor Experiment 
The first study involves a single-factor vignette experiment with formalization of the rule 
as the manipulated variable and rule following as the outcome of interest. The research subjects 
were 75 Masters of Public Administration (MPA) students enrolled in two organizational 
analysis and two public finance courses at a large university in the Midwestern United States. 
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The experiment was designed to test the first hypothesis about the effect of rule formalization on 
rule following.  
The experiment was administered at the end of class. Students were not compensated and 
participation was voluntary. The organizational analysis class received two points of extra credit 
on an upcoming exam. Research participants were randomly assigned into one of two 
experimental conditions. Both conditions involved a workplace scenario where the respondent 
was asked to take on the role of a supervisor and decide whether to follow or break a rule that 
would require suspending an employee for a week because of too many unexcused absences. 
One participant failed to indicate whether they would follow the rule or not. Therefore, the final 
number of participants was 74. Figure 1 details the experimental conditions. 
 
Figure 1. 
Experimental Study 1 Conditions 
 
Rule following was measured as a dichotomous choice between breaking a rule and 
following a rule. While there are many types of rule behavior (e.g., prosocial rule breaking 
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(Morrison, 2006), rule rigidity (Merton, 1940), discretionary rule behavior (Maynard-Moody & 
Portillo, 2010), the simplified notion of rule following as either rule bending or rule following is 
a common one that allows us to test the relative strength of the written versus unwritten nature of 
rules on rule behavior. Thus, the end of the vignette asked research participants to choose 
whether to ‘follow the rule’ by suspending the employee or ‘break the rule’ by not suspending 
the employee. The order of rule following versus rule breaking (whether presented first or 
second) was rotated to eliminate the risk of bias toward the first choice and minimize social 
cueing to either follow or break the rule. The vignette was followed by a brief survey that 
included a manipulation check and demographic questions.   
The vignettes were randomly assigned by alternately distributing the written and 
unwritten rule scenarios to students. A cover sheet was placed over each packet so that research 
participants could not see the vignette assigned to their neighbor. To check that random 
assignment produced comparable conditions, the groups were compared for age, gender, work 
experience in the public sector, and previous and current management experience.   
 
Table 1: Sample Composition on Study 1 Background Variables 
  
Average 
Age 
(Years) 
Female  
Work in 
Public 
Sector 
Prior 
Mgmt 
Experience 
Current 
Mgmt 
Experience 
Unwritten 29.62 42% 63% 19% 31% 
Written 29.41 56% 77% 15% 26% 
 
Mean 29.51 49% 70% 17% 29% 
 
Difference 
Tests 
t=0.102 χ2=1.628 χ
2 =1.701 
p=.192 
χ2 =0.215 
p=.643 
χ2 =0.224 
p=.636 
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Experimental participants vary in demographic and professional characteristics (Table 1). 
The average research participant was 29.5 years of age and women comprised 49.3 per cent of 
study participants. Seventy per cent of the participants were working in the public sector, 17.3 
per cent had previous management experience, and 29.3 per cent had current management 
experience. Independent samples t-tests and chi-squared tests show that the groups are 
comparable in demographic and experience characteristics. This cancels out potential 
confounding effects, making it unnecessary to include these background variables in the analyses 
for the experiment (Campbell, 1963). 
The experiment revealed that rule following is strongly influenced by whether the rule is 
written (Figure 1). Sixty-eight per cent of experimental participants receiving the written rule 
condition indicated that they would comply, compared with only 36 per cent receiving the 
unwritten rule. Thus, having written rules nearly doubles rule following. Proportional difference 
tests between the written and unwritten scenarios are statistically significant (z = 2.78, p <.01). 
This result confirms the first hypothesis, that rule formalization elicits more rule following than 
unwritten rules.  
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Figure 2. Rule Formalization and Rule Following 
 
3.2 Study 2: Two-Factor Experiment  
The second study is a 2 x 2 between-subject experiment with rule formalization and 
consistency as the manipulated variables. The research subjects were 150 public works managers 
in the Southeastern United States. The average age was 49 years (SD=8.20) and 46 per cent of 
the public works managers in our study were female. The experiment was administered online 
using Qualtrics, an online survey platform. Participants were recruited through a public works 
association and rewarded with free admission to a webinar on human resource management. 
Research participation was voluntary and anonymous, with no identifiers collected. 
Research participants were assigned into one of four experimental conditions (Figure 3), 
featuring an organizational rule that was either (1) written and consistent, (2) unwritten and 
consistent, (3) written and inconsistent, and (4) unwritten and inconsistent. The organizational 
rule is the same that was used in Study 1, with the requirement to suspend without pay any 
36%
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employee with four unexcused late arrivals in a pay period. Figure 3 depicts the experimental 
conditions.  
 
Figure 3. Study 2 Experimental Conditions 
 
 Table 2 compares the demographic variables that could affect rule following, such as age 
and gender, between the four groups. The differences between the control and treatment groups 
on gender and age are all insignificant, indicating that the groups were equivalent with regards to 
these variables. This cancels out potential confounding effects, making it unnecessary to include 
these background variables in the analyses for the experiment (Campbell, 1963). 
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Table 2. Sample Composition on Study 2 Background Variables 
 % Female  Average  
Age 
Unwritten, Inconsistent 47% 49.71 
Unwritten, Consistent 58% 49.95 
Written, Inconsistent 47% 47.37 
Written, Consistent 31% 47.88 
   
Mean 46% 48.73 
   
Difference Tests Chi Square=5.679,  
p=.128 
ANOVA,  
F=.925,  
p=.431 
 
 
Proportional difference testing revealed a significant main effect of written rules on rule 
following: 50 per cent of the participants that received the unwritten version of the rule said that 
they would follow the rule in this scenario. Conversely, a high number (89.2 per cent) of the 
participants that received the written rule said that they would follow the rule in this scenario. 
Proportional difference tests between the written and unwritten scenarios are highly statistically 
significant (z =5.20, p <.01).  Hence, results further confirm the first hypothesis that written rules 
elicit greater rule following than unwritten rules. 
Proportional difference testing also revealed a significant main effect for rule consistency 
on rule following (z = 3.19, p <.01). Eighty-one per cent of experimental participants receiving 
the consistently applied rule complied with it, compared to 57 per cent receiving the 
inconsistently applied rule. This difference of nearly 24 per cent confirms the second hypothesis 
that consistently applied rules will elicit higher rule following than inconsistently applied rules.  
As Figure 4 indicates, the rule that is both written and consistently applied increases the 
percentage of respondents that follow the rule, but not enough to support a statistically 
significant interaction effect anticipated by the third hypothesis. The written and consistent 
 17 
condition elicits higher rule following than the unwritten and consistent condition (z=3.50, 
p<0.01), the written and inconsistent condition (z=2.25, p<0.05) and the unwritten and 
inconsistent condition (z=5.98, p <.001). Practically, the effect sizes are large. In the unwritten 
and inconsistent condition, only 34 per cent of the managers followed the organizational 
rule. Rule following increased to 66 per cent for the unwritten and consistent condition and to 81 
per cent for the written and inconsistent condition. When research participants received a rule 
that was both written and consistently applied, 97 per cent said that they would comply. This is a 
difference of 31 per cent for consistently applied rules that differed only in whether they were 
written or unwritten, and a difference of 16 per cent in written rules that are consistently versus 
inconsistently applied. 
 
 
Figure 4. Rule Formalization, Consistency and Rule following 
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3.3 Study 3: Organizational Survey 
The third study collected survey data from the employees of two local government organizations, 
a medium-sized college town and a consolidated city-county mental health department in a state 
of the Southeastern U.S. The two organizations were participants in the Local Government 
Workplaces Project, a cross-organizational data collection started in 2004 to study organizational 
dynamics in cities and counties.  
The research team sought the perspectives of employees throughout each organization’s 
hierarchy, representing an ‘echelon’ approach of multiple informants with different 
organizational perspectives (Walker & Brewer, 2008). As such, questionnaires were distributed 
to all members of both organizations, totaling 1,027 employees. Communications between 
researchers and respondents were structured based on the tailored design method for mixed-
mode surveys, featuring multiple contacts and consistent messaging with prospective research 
participants (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009). Each survey process began with an alert letter 
from the top organizational leader expressing support for the study, encouraging voluntary 
participation and guaranteeing confidentiality. Within two weeks of the alert letter, surveys were 
distributed through Qualtrics. In the case of the town, paper questionnaires were also distributed 
to employees without regular email access and who preferred to complete paper surveys. Mental 
health department employees were surveyed only using Qualtrics. Whether collected through 
paper or Internet, all survey responses were returned directly to the research team. This process 
yielded 713 usable responses, representing a sample-weighted response rate of 69 per cent (60 
per cent for the town and 85 per cent for the mental health department).  
 The dependent variable of interest is a three-item scale that captures rule-following 
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attitudes, based on the assumption that attitudes influence behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). In 
empirical support of this proposition, a meta-analysis of 88 studies found that attitudes 
significantly and strongly predicted future behavior (Kraus, 1995). Attitude-behavior 
relationships are strongest when the object of attitudes and behavior are specific and aligned with 
one another (Ajzen & Cote, 2008), as in this study. Attitudes have been used as a proxy for rule 
following behavior in a number of studies (Portillo & DeHart-Davis, 2009; DeHart-Davis, 
2009b).  
The survey items used to measure rule-following attitudes are described in Table 3, along 
with those used to measure the explanatory variables of rule formalization and consistency. 
These measures of rule-following attitudes were adapted from Baker et al. (1973) and Gordon 
(1970) and have been used since that time in green tape survey research (DeHart-Davis, 2009a; 
2009b).  For the first and third items, 0 represents strongly disagree and 4 represents strongly 
agree; a higher level of agreement indicates more rule following. For the second item that asks 
about pointless rules, 0 represents strongly agree and 4 represents strongly disagree, indicating 
that a higher level of disagreement indicates more rule following. Cronbach’s alpha for these 
items is 0.70. Descriptive statistics provided in Table 4 suggest that organization members 
largely agree that they obey dislikable rules and assume that rules are there for a purpose, and 
mostly disagree that they will circumvent rules that they find pointless. For the purpose of 
analysis, these items were added together to create a summative scale to measure rule-following 
attitudes. Survey participants on average exhibit favorable rule-following attitudes, as the three 
rule-following items together have a mean of 9.5 (out of a maximum value of 12).  
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Table 3. Survey Items Used to Measure Dependent and Independent Variables  
Construct Survey Measure Scale 
Rule Following (Dependent 
Variable) 
Even if I dislike a rule, I usually 
obey it. (Obey) 
0-Strongly Disagree; 1-
Disagree; 2-Neither Agree nor 
Disagree; 3-Agree, 4-Strongly 
Agree 
Rule Following (Dependent 
Variable) 
If I think a rule is pointless, I will 
find a way around it. (Pointless, 
Reversed)  
0-Strongly Disagree; 1-
Disagree; 2-Neither Agree nor 
Disagree; 3-Agree, 4-Strongly 
Agree 
Rule Following (Dependent 
Variable) 
I figure rules are there for a 
purpose. (Purpose) 
0-Strongly Disagree; 1-
Disagree; 2-Neither Agree nor 
Disagree; 3-Agree, 4-Strongly 
Agree 
Rule Formalization 
(Independent Variable) 
To what extent are rules in your 
workplace written? 
No or Few Rules- 0, Some 
Rules-1, and Many or All Rules-
2 
Rule Consistency (Independent 
Variable) 
To what extent are rules in your 
workplace consistently applied? 
No or Few Rules- 0, Some 
Rules-1, and Many or All Rules-
2 
 
 
The independent variables are rule formalization and rule consistency, measured by two 
separate items that ask for the extent of workplace rules that are written and consistent, 
respectively (Table 3). Response choices include ‘None,’ ‘Few,’ ‘Some,’ ‘Many,’ or ‘All Rules,’ 
coded as 0 to 4. The average respondent indicates between some and many rules are written 
(mean is 2.67), while the average respondent indicates slightly more than some rules are 
consistent (mean is 2.11). Because few respondents indicated that No or All rules are written and 
consistent, these categories were collapsed from the original data into three rather than five 
categories each: ‘No’ or ‘Few’ rules are coded as 0, ‘Some’ is coded as 1, and ‘Many’ or ‘All’ 
rules are coded as 2. When the responses are collapsed into no/few rules, some rules, and 
many/all rules (coded as 0 to 2), the average respondent reports between some and many/all rules 
are written (mean is 1.53) and that on average some rules are consistently applied (mean is 1.06). 
 Control variables include gender and supervisory status. Gender is included based on 
theoretical expectations that women are more likely to follow rules more than men due to 
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differing cultural expectations for gender behavior (Portillo & DeHart-Davis 2009). Supervisory 
status is included based on the expectation that rule behavior depends on hierarchical status and 
that supervisors will generally have more latitude to bend rules than non-supervisors. Women 
comprise 49 per cent of the sample and supervisors make up 25 per cent.  We have also 
employed a fixed effect term to account for organizational variation.  While the use of the fixed 
effect completely separates the between organization variation, it accounts for other 
unobservable organization effects as well. 
 As shown in Table 4, the items comprising the summative scale to measure the dependent 
variable of rule following (‘obey’, ‘pointless’, and ‘purpose’ ) are all positively correlated with 
one another.  The independent variables of rule formalization (‘written’) and rule consistentcy 
are positively correlated at the .36 level, demonstrating their distinctive attributes as measured in 
the current study.  Finally, rule following attitudes are positively correlated with the independent 
variables of rule formalization and rule consistency at the .15 and .21 levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Responses 
Item N Range Mean SD Rule Following 
Obey Pointless Purpose Written Consistent Women Supervisor  City 
Rule 
Following 624 2 – 12 9.516 1.911 
1.000 – – – – – – – – 
Obey 624 0 – 4 3.271 0.763 0.830** 1.000 – – – – – – – 
Pointless 624 0 – 4 3.011 0.924 0.784** 0.427** 1.000 – – – – – – 
Purpose 624 0 – 4 3.220 0.723 0.778** 0.595** 0.342** 1.000 – – – – – 
Written 618 0 – 2 1.533 0.664 0.154** 0.084* 0.131** 0.147** 1.000 – – – – 
Consistent 617 0 – 2 1.056 0.764 0.211** 0.113** 0.159** 0.230** 0.360** 1.000 – – – 
Women 620 0 – 1 0.485 0.500 0.133** 0.107** 0.132** 0.074 -0.076 0.038 1.000 – – 
Supervisor 614 0 – 1 0.248 0.432 -0.006 0.056 -0.100* 0.048 0.105** 0.077 0.148** 1.000 – 
City 624 0 – 1 0.352 0.748 0.177** 0.136** 0.189** 0.078 0.018 0.181** .462** -.276** 1.000 
* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01  
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An OLS regression model tests the influence of rule formalization and consistency on 
rule following attitudes. Other modeling strategies like ordered logistic regression could also be 
used to model the data. However, Winship and Mare (1984) note that ordered logistic models 
assume an error distribution that is logistically distributed, and violations of this assumption may 
influence both the biasedness of the parameter as well as tests of significance. OLS models are 
unbiased even though they may technically violate the Gauss-Markov assumption of non-
continous data, but this only affects the test of significance.  Additionally, OLS model are much 
easier to interpret, especially with the use of interaction terms, and further justify its use (Angrist 
& Pischke 2008).  
We also test the interaction between rule formalization and consistency to explore its 
impact on rule following. To reduce multicollinearity between these two variables and their 
resulting interaction term, rule formalization and consistency were mean-centered first and then 
multiplied to create the interaction term. Results are reported in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Green Tape Attributes and Rule Following 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  R2 = 0.072; F = 10.314** R2 = 0.089; F = 10.848** 
Variable β Standardized 
β β 
Standardized 
β 
Constant 
8.356** 
– 
8.048** 
– 
(0.21) (0.23) 
Written 0.327** 0.115** 0.513** 0.183** (0.12) (0.13) 
Consistent 
0.364** 
0.147** 
0.300** 
0.121** (0.11) (0.11) 
Women 
0.341* 
0.09* 
0.313  
0.082  (0.17) (0.17) 
Supervisor 
0.039  
0.009  
0.073  
0.017  (0.18) (0.18) 
City Fixed Effect 
0.415  
0.102** 
0.387  
0.095* 
(0.19) (0.19) 
Interaction  
- - 
0.569** 
0.152** (written x 
consistent) (0.16) 
* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 5 supports the first and second hypotheses, that rule following will 
increase in the presence of rule formalization and rule consistency. Model 2, which interacts rule 
consistency and rule formalization, confirms the findings in Model 1: rule formalization and 
consistency correlate with rule following, with the interaction of rule formalization and 
consistency strengthening the correlation. Gender has a positive relationship with rule following 
attitudes in model 1, but there is no significant relationship with supervisory status in either 
model. 
To understand the substantive significance of this interaction, the values are plotted in 
Figure 5. The fit lines indicate three categories of rule formalization, noted in the figure as the 
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extent to which rules  are written: None or Few (0), Some (1), and Many or All (2). When 
respondents report that no or few rules are written, there is a negligible weakening in rule 
following attitudes as consistency increases. When respondents indicate that some rules are 
written, rule following attitudes slightly weaken as rule consistency increases. By contrast, when 
respondents indicate that many or all rules are written, rule following attitudes strengthen as 
consistency increases. This indicates that consistency packs the biggest punch when many or all 
rules are written, which is in line with our theoretical expectations.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.  
Rule Consistency, Formalization and Rule Following 
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Of note here are the low R2 values in these models. Given the simplicity of these models, 
testing the impact of only five and six variables on our dependent variable, respectively, this is 
not surprising. What is somewhat surprising is the relatively large increase once the interaction is 
introduced: variance explained increases from 7.2 per cent to 8.9 per cent. This increase of close 
to 2 per cent, while small in absolute terms, represents a 23 per cent increase in overall variance 
explained.  
 
4. Discussion  
This research examines the influence of two organizational rule attributes—rule 
formalization and rule consistency—on organizational rule following in public organizations. 
Rule formalization, the extent to which rules are available in writing, was hypothesized to 
increase rule following by infusing rule requirements with greater legitimacy and focusing the 
attention of organizational members. Rule consistency was also hypothesized to elicit rule 
following, by conveying peer support for rule requirements. The third hypothesis expected the 
combination of rule formalization and rule consistency to interact to increase rule following 
beyond their independent effects.  
  Across studies, rule formalization is associated with rule following. This finding suggests 
the power of written rules for achieving organizational preferences, by legitimizing rule 
requirements and focusing organizational member requirements on them. For government reform 
advocates who propose internal deregulation as one strategy for increasing the efficiency and 
responsiveness of public organizations (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), the results of this study raise 
an interesting question: does internal deregulation reduce public sector capacity for achieving 
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organizational preferences? The question is particularly poignant if, as some scholars have 
suggested, internal deregulation simply shifts rules from written to unwritten form (Stokes & 
Clegg, 2002; McCullough & Shannon, 1977). Future research should explore these possibilities.  
Also across studies, rule consistency correlates with rule following. That consistency 
fosters rule following suggests what Brehm and Gates hypothesized (1997): public employees 
pay close attention to peripheral cues about appropriate behavior. This finding sheds a different 
light on the public organizational rules literature, which tends to focus on rule rigidity as a worst-
case characteristic of organizational rules (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). Rule consistency is not 
about rule rigidity, but rather is about not systematically exempting specific people or groups 
from the rules intended to cover them (DeHart-Davis, 2009a). From a theoretical perspective, 
rule consistency emerges as a fundamental attribute of rule implementation and a rule behavior 
with implications for rule effectiveness and informal structure.  
While all three studies support the first two hypotheses, there is mixed support for the 
anticipated interaction effect of rule formalization and consistency on rule following. The survey 
study supports an interaction effect on rule following, measured using rule-following attitudes. 
But the second study, a vignette experiment, failed to detect an interaction effect. In the survey 
results, the interaction effect was not uniform: consistency increased favorable attitudes towards 
rule following only when many or all rules were written. This result makes intuitive sense: 
written rules provide a standard by which consistent application can be measured. If rules are 
perceived as less formal—that is, not written—consistency may have less meaning. Future 
research should continue to investigate individual green tape attributes, but also examine their 
combined effects on rule behavior. 
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Beyond rule attributes, the results of this study pose two implications for practice. First, 
that written rules achieve more rule following than unwritten rules suggests that formal structure 
is a powerful determinant of rule behavior. But consistency’s effect on rule following suggests 
that informal social structure within an organization also regulates behavior, echoing North’s 
thesis that informal structures (behavioral codes, conventions, customs) profoundly influence 
formal mechanisms imposed by government (1990). Informal organizational structure resides 
outside the personnel manual and organization chart, providing signals to organizational 
members about acceptable behavior (Chisholm, 1992; Barnard, 1968; Selznick, 1948; Gulati & 
Puranam, 2009; Soda & Zaheer, 2014). Through information about the behavior of like others, 
rule consistency provides one such signal that triggers imitative rule behavior (Brehm & Gates, 
1997). Organizational rules thus contain elements of both formal and informal structure.  
A second implication pertains to the validity of green tape theory, which argues the 
importance of rule formalization and consistency for eliciting rule following (DeHart-Davis, 
2009a). Green tape theory argues that well-designed rules require willing followers (DeHart-
Davis 2009), which raises questions about whether rule following equates to rule effectiveness. 
The answer from a green tape theory perspective is no, particularly when rules are poorly 
designed or used for illegitimate purposes (DeHart-Davis 2017).   
 
4.1 Limitations 
Despite the insights that this multi-method study provides into the relationship between 
rule attributes and rule following, it is important to note the study’s limitations.  First, the 
experimental vignettes involve a rule that, to some, may seem excessively rigid and illogical. 
However, this type of a rule is not uncommon in local government organizations (DeHart-Davis, 
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2017). What appears as a bad rule from the viewpoint of an academic may seem an effective rule 
to the managers and MPA students who participated in this study. Such a subjective evaluation is 
difficult to determine without understanding organizational purposes and workplace context. We 
do not construe the content of the experimental rule conditions as green tape, but rather seek to 
isolate the relationships between two green tape attributes and rule following. Thus, we 
acknowledge that our test of green tape theory is partial and should be extended in future 
research.  
The conduct of research in the U.S., where managerial concerns over liability can drive 
rule behavior (Epp 1998), raises questions about the generalizability of results. This limitation is 
rendered less significant by the inclusion of survey data from local government employees 
located across the hierarchy, many of whom do not face the risks of lawsuits and legal 
infractions. Nonetheless, comparative research would be a welcome contribution to public 
administration research on rule behavior.   
Another limitation, from the experimental design, is the use of a simple and 
straightforward rule that focuses on employee punctuality, which represents a clearly defined 
organizational preference that is easily understood by rule stakeholders and relatively 
uncontestable as an organizational goal. Furthermore, the ‘outcome’ of following or bending our 
fictitious rule is dichotomous: either the employee is suspended, or not. Yet, many organizational 
rules exist in practice for which purposes, implications, and outcomes are much more 
ambiguous. As the literature on regulatory compliance conveys, ambiguity can pose a barrier to 
rule following and clear rules are generally easier to follow (Gilad 2014; Weaver, 2014; 2015). 
While this study used an unambiguous rule to isolate the effect of rule formalization and 
consistency on compliance, future studies should incorporate ambiguity as a covarying rule 
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attribute to reflect a broader range of real-world conditions.  
We acknowledge that the rule used in our experimental studies is stylized and that 
organizational reality is much more complex. At the same time, limiting external validity in 
favor of being able to test for causality is worthwhile in this case because we see the individual 
effects of written and consistent rules. This limitation is partially mitigated by the research 
design, which involves a survey study to increase contextual realism and external validity.  
Another qualification pertains to the experiment’s omission of consequences for rule 
violations. While consequences for rule violation can influence rule behavior, the influence is 
limited when rule violations carry little consequence. This tendency toward rule nonconsequence 
has been observed in a wide array of organizational settings, from narcotics law enforcement 
(Manning, 1977) to safety rules (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998) to minority contracting 
(Terman, 2017). Given that rules are mostly followed in public organizations, detecting and 
punishing rule volations becomes an ineffective investment of managerial time. Future research 
should consider the impact of rule violation consequences when studying rule behavior by 
employees. 
Construct validity of our experimental measures is also an issue. Most notably, written 
and unwritten rules were both conveyed to research subjects in writing, triggering the question of 
whether unwritten rules could have been more validly communicated in the experiment through 
auditory means, such as, audio or visual media. While this is a legitimate research consideration 
that should be addressed in future research, the current research design likely underestimates the 
compliance differential in written and unwritten rules by infusing the unwritten rule with the 
authority of the written word (DeHart-Davis et al., 2013).  
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 A final comment pertains to the study’s measures of rule following. The experiment 
measured rule following as a research participant’s stated decision to follow or break a rule. The 
survey’s compliance measure was multi-dimensional, tapping compliance attitudes towards rule 
following. Employing both attitudes and stated intentions as dependent variabes allowed us to 
measure both the ‘talk’ and the ‘walk’ of rule compliance. Because attitudes preceed intention 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005), the use of both constructs allowed us to tap multiple locations on the 
rule behavior spectrum (DeHart-Davis, 2017). Furthermore, there is evidence that intentions 
correlate with actual behavior when the context of the vignette is similar to a real-life context 
that the respondent is likely to face (Aguinis, 2014). This holds particularly true for our second 
experiment, in which public managers were asked to respond to a situation that they are likely to 
encounter in their everyday activities. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the responses in 
the experiment and survey are attitudes and intended actions, which may vary in different 
contexts. Again, longitudinal case studies that combine observational and archival data can offer 
important insights into these topics.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 This examination of organizational rule attributes and rule following marks a new 
direction in public management and organizational research, which has tended to focus on rules 
as a monolithic form of structure (Pugh, et al., 1968). Our focus on rule attributes not only 
enhances understanding of effective organizational rules (albeit incompletely so), it also offers 
practical implications that can be acted upon by public managers in the pursuit of organizational 
effectiveness. Given the instrumental role of organizational rules in public sector functioning—
whether to symbolize public values, ensure efficient and effective operations, or signal 
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organizational legitimacy—rule behavior research merits a permanent spot on public 
administration research agendas. 
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